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Why is a woman not mekudeshes when given money on condition she return it? The shiur develops a chiddush in the Rambam (רמב"ם): the condition applies to the kiddushin itself, not to the money. Unlike a standard matana al menas le'hachzir (where ownership of the object is conditional), here the kiddushin is conditional—she receives the money but the marriage only takes effect if she returns it.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 6b's discussion of matana al menas le'hachzir (a gift given on condition of return) in the context of kiddushin. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a case where a man gives a woman money for kiddushin stipulating that she must return it. Rabbi Zweig explores fundamental questions about the nature of such conditional transactions. The shiur begins by addressing Tosafos (תוספות)'s question: why didn't the Gemara immediately invoke the principle of tnai kaful (double condition)? The Minchas Chinuch suggests it must not be a tnai kaful here. Rabbi Zweig develops this to mean that when someone gives an object "al menas le'hachzir," it becomes fully the recipient's property, but with an obligation to return it—similar to a debt. If the recipient doesn't return it, they owe the value, but the object itself remains theirs.
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Kiddushin 6b
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