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Why does the Torah (תורה) use both "negifa" and "negicha" in discussing an ox that gores? The Gemara (גמרא) questions whether negifa is a separate av (primary category) or merely a tolda (subcategory). Rashi (רש"י) offers two explanations—premeditation versus depth of penetration—but the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s approach may be simpler: negifa in the pasuk actually refers to full goring (negicha), and the terminology teaches that an animal requires less involvement than a person to be liable.
This shiur analyzes a complex Gemara (גמרא) in Bava Kamma 2b dealing with the distinction between "negifa" and "negicha" when an ox gores. The central question is whether negifa constitutes an independent av (primary category of damage) or is merely a tolda (subcategory) of keren (goring). The Gemara begins by questioning why the Torah (תורה) uses the term "negifa" if it means the same as "negicha." Rashi (רש"י) offers two interpretations: (1) negicha refers to premeditated goring while negifa is spontaneous; (2) negicha involves deeper penetration (four inches) while negifa is shallower (one inch). According to the first interpretation, the difference between tam (an ox that has not established a pattern of goring) and muad (one that has) could be understood as the difference between non-premeditated and premeditated acts—the first three gorings are negifa, but once it becomes muad, it's negicha.
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Bava Kamma 2b
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