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Does the principle of adam mu'ad l'olam—that a person is always liable for damages—apply equally to nezikin (property damage) and the four types of bodily injury (arba devarim)? The shiur analyzes a fundamental dispute between Rashi (רש"י) and the Kivei HaGra regarding whether shogeg (unintentional) actions trigger liability for both categories, tracing the implications through Rashi's different approaches in Yevamos and Bava Kamma.
This shiur explores a fundamental machlokes in Gemara (גמרא) Bava Kamma 26b regarding the scope of liability under the principle of adam mu'ad l'olam (a person is always considered forewarned/liable). The discussion centers on whether this principle applies equally to damages (nezikin) and to the four types of bodily injury compensation (arba devarim: pain, medical expenses, unemployment, and embarrassment). Rabbi Zweig begins by examining Rashi (רש"י)'s statement in Yevamos regarding the case of someone who falls from a roof. Rashi there explains that the person is liable "bein b'shogeg bein b'meizid" (whether unintentionally or intentionally). However, the Kivei HaGra (Rav Akiva Eiger) challenges this reading, noting that the Gemara in Bava Kamma clearly states that for arba devarim, one is exempt (patur) in cases of shogeg. How can Rashi say one is liable both b'shogeg and b'meizid when the Gemara explicitly distinguishes between nezikin (where one is liable even b'shogeg) and arba devarim (where one is exempt b'shogeg)?
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Bava Kamma 26b
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