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Can you appoint an agent for pidyon haben? The shiur develops the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position that pidyon haben is fundamentally a commitment—bechor bonecha titen li—not merely a monetary transaction. The Rosh's position that a son must "separate" the money even when his kohen father inherited it reveals that pidyon haben contains both financial and dedication dimensions.
This shiur explores Masechta Kiddushin 29a-b through the lens of a fundamental question about the nature of pidyon haben (redemption of the firstborn): is it primarily a monetary obligation or an act of spiritual commitment? The discussion begins with a practical dispute between the Rama and later authorities (Taz, Shach, Vilna Gaon) regarding whether agency (shlichus) can be used for pidyon haben. The Rama rules in Yoreh Deah 305:10 that one cannot appoint an agent for pidyon haben, while the Gaon and others argue that since it's merely a monetary obligation, agency should work through the principle of shliach k'moso (an agent is like oneself). The shiur then examines a complex case presented in the Gemara (גמרא): when a kohen has a son who is a chalal (lacking kehuna status), the son requires pidyon haben. If the father dies after thirty days, the Gemara states the son is exempt because any redemption money would have gone back to the father (as a kohen). Yet the Rosh in Perek 8, Siman 3 in Bechoros rules that although the son doesn't owe money to a kohen, he must still perform an act of hafrashas hadadamim—separating the redemption money. This implies pidyon haben contains an element beyond mere payment.
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Kiddushin 29a-b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
