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Can you appoint an agent for pidyon haben? The shiur develops the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position that pidyon haben is fundamentally a commitment—bechor bonecha titen li—not merely a monetary transaction. The Rosh's position that a son must "separate" the money even when his kohen father inherited it reveals that pidyon haben contains both financial and dedication dimensions.
This shiur explores Masechta Kiddushin 29a-b through the lens of a fundamental question about the nature of pidyon haben (redemption of the firstborn): is it primarily a monetary obligation or an act of spiritual commitment? The discussion begins with a practical dispute between the Rama and later authorities (Taz, Shach, Vilna Gaon) regarding whether agency (shlichus) can be used for pidyon haben. The Rama rules in Yoreh Deah 305:10 that one cannot appoint an agent for pidyon haben, while the Gaon and others argue that since it's merely a monetary obligation, agency should work through the principle of shliach k'moso (an agent is like oneself). The shiur then examines a complex case presented in the Gemara (גמרא): when a kohen has a son who is a chalal (lacking kehuna status), the son requires pidyon haben. If the father dies after thirty days, the Gemara states the son is exempt because any redemption money would have gone back to the father (as a kohen). Yet the Rosh in Perek 8, Siman 3 in Bechoros rules that although the son doesn't owe money to a kohen, he must still perform an act of hafrashas hadadamim—separating the redemption money. This implies pidyon haben contains an element beyond mere payment.
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Kiddushin 29a-b
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