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Why does one who says "mudrani himecha" (I am forbidden to you) followed by "shani ochaloch" (I will eat from you) remain permitted? The shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא)'s progression from viewing mudrani mimcha as entirely ineffective to understanding it as creating shared prohibitions. The Ran's approach distinguishes between situations where the vow itself creates the prohibition versus where external Torah (תורה) law generates the restriction.
This advanced shiur on Nedarim 4b works through the Gemara (גמרא)'s complex treatment of vow language, particularly focusing on what happens when someone makes seemingly contradictory statements. The Gemara begins with Shmuel's position that in the Mishna, when someone uses both terms—mudrani mimcha (I am forbidden to you) and shani ochaloch (I will eat from you)—the implication is that you need both expressions together for the vow to take effect. The initial assumption is that mudrani mimcha by itself accomplishes nothing—it's not even considered a yad she'ein mochiach (an unclear hand/indication). The Gemara challenges this understanding from two Braisos. The first Braisa appears to state mudrani mimcha alone creates a prohibition, and suggests this might be because it's b'medvar amur—meaning the second statement clarifies the first. The second Braisa reverses the order, placing shani ochaloch first and mudrani mimcha second, which the Gemara interprets as kvar amar—he already said it. Both Braisos seem to indicate that mudrani mimcha by itself would be sufficient to create prohibition, contradicting Shmuel's requirement for both terms.
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Nedarim 4b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
