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What is the nature of the father's obligation in milah and pidyon haben, and how does it differ from Beis Din's responsibility? The shiur explores whether the father's mitzvah (מצוה) is mitzvos ha'av (the father's own obligation) or mitzvos haben (ensuring the son's mitzvah is done), analyzing Rashi (רש"י), Rambam (רמב"ם), and Tosafos (תוספות) to clarify when Shehecheyanu is recited and why women are exempt. A key insight emerges: according to the Rambam, Beis Din has no mitzvah per se—only a responsibility to prevent kares.
This shiur provides a comprehensive analysis of Kiddushin 29a, focusing on the respective obligations of fathers and Beis Din in the mitzvos of bris milah and pidyon haben. Rabbi Zweig begins by noting an apparent inconsistency in the Gemara (גמרא)'s language: by milah, the question is whether a woman is "mechuyav" (obligated), whereas by pidyon haben, the question is whether she is "mifkade" (appointed or in charge). This linguistic shift suggests a fundamental conceptual distinction between the two mitzvos. The shiur distinguishes between mitzvos ha'av (the father's own obligation) and mitzvos haben (the obligation to ensure the son's mitzvah (מצוה) is performed). According to Rashi (רש"י), milah involves both: the father has a mitzvah, and Beis Din also has a responsibility. The Gemara's question regarding women is whether they share in mitzvos ha'av. By pidyon haben, however, the language "mifkade" suggests a focus on mitzvos haben—being appointed to carry out the son's obligation. This linguistic precision illuminates the nature of each mitzvah.
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Kiddushin 29a
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