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What is the nature of the father's obligation in milah and pidyon haben, and how does it differ from Beis Din's responsibility? The shiur explores whether the father's mitzvah (מצוה) is mitzvos ha'av (the father's own obligation) or mitzvos haben (ensuring the son's mitzvah is done), analyzing Rashi (רש"י), Rambam (רמב"ם), and Tosafos (תוספות) to clarify when Shehecheyanu is recited and why women are exempt. A key insight emerges: according to the Rambam, Beis Din has no mitzvah per se—only a responsibility to prevent kares.
This shiur provides a comprehensive analysis of Kiddushin 29a, focusing on the respective obligations of fathers and Beis Din in the mitzvos of bris milah and pidyon haben. Rabbi Zweig begins by noting an apparent inconsistency in the Gemara (גמרא)'s language: by milah, the question is whether a woman is "mechuyav" (obligated), whereas by pidyon haben, the question is whether she is "mifkade" (appointed or in charge). This linguistic shift suggests a fundamental conceptual distinction between the two mitzvos. The shiur distinguishes between mitzvos ha'av (the father's own obligation) and mitzvos haben (the obligation to ensure the son's mitzvah (מצוה) is performed). According to Rashi (רש"י), milah involves both: the father has a mitzvah, and Beis Din also has a responsibility. The Gemara's question regarding women is whether they share in mitzvos ha'av. By pidyon haben, however, the language "mifkade" suggests a focus on mitzvos haben—being appointed to carry out the son's obligation. This linguistic precision illuminates the nature of each mitzvah.
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Kiddushin 29a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
