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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) say a murderer is pulled away from the altar even during avodah? Rashi (רש"י)'s reading that the kohen "wants to do avodah" seems inconsistent with the logic that retzichah overrides avodah. The shiur develops a fundamental yesod: beis din's execution is not a bitul (nullification) of mitzvos but a kiyum (fulfillment) of what must be done, and therefore not a chillul Shabbos (שבת).
This advanced Gemara (גמרא) shiur analyzes Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation of Yevamos 7a regarding the pasuk "me'al mizbeiachi tikachena lamus" — that a kohen who is a roteach (murderer) is pulled away from the altar even while performing avodah. The central difficulty is understanding Rashi's formulation that "if he wants to do avodah, you take him away," which seems to contradict the Gemara's logic that retzichah is docheh avodah. The shiur begins by questioning the basic understanding of the sugya. If the pasuk teaches that we pull a murderer away from the altar even during avodah, this should demonstrate that avodah does NOT override retzichah. Yet Rashi seems to learn the opposite — that retzichah overrides avodah. The fundamental question emerges: where do we see from this pasuk that retzichah is docheh avodah at all? The simple reading suggests only that holding onto the mizbeach provides no sanctuary for a murderer.
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Yevamos 7a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
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Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
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