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When Chazal enacted Takanas Hashavim allowing one who built with stolen materials to compensate with money rather than dismantling, did they transfer ownership or merely exempt from returning the object? The shiur distinguishes two categories: where massive loss would discourage universal compliance (e.g., beams in a house), the Rabbis made it fully yours to prevent a bad precedent; where return is easy (e.g., sheni she'eino chozer), they merely permit monetary settlement without transferring title.
This shiur analyzes the fundamental distinction between two types of Takanas Hashavim (Rabbinic enactments concerning stolen property) through a close reading of Tosfos on Sukkah 30b-31a and the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s treatment in Hilchos Gezeilah and Hilchos Sukkah. The shiur begins with Tosfos's question on Sukkah 31a regarding shini she'eino chozer (stolen property that won't return to its original state). Tosfos asks: if property acquired only m'derabbanan through Takanas Hashavim is insufficient for the mitzvah (מצוה) of lechem (since the acquisition is only rabbinic), how can one fulfill the Torah (תורה)-level mitzvah of sukkah with a stolen beam, which is also only acquired m'derabbanan through Takanas Hashavim? Tosfos answers that the case of the beam is different because it involves Takanas Hashavim. But this seems circular—both cases involve Takanas Hashavim.
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Sukkah 30b-31a
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