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Can a kinyan derabanan create ownership mideOraisa, or does it only work for rabbinic purposes? The shiur examines this question through cases of stolen objects used for kiddushin, ma'amad sheloshtam, mechiras shtaros, and takkanas hashavah. A key chiluk emerges: when the kinyan mechanism itself exists mideOraisa but an obligation to return blocks ownership, removing that obligation creates Torah (תורה)-level ownership; when the kinyan itself is purely rabbinic (like ma'amad sheloshtam), it cannot create mideOraisa effects.
The shiur presents a fundamental question in the intersection of kiddushin, gezeila, and kinyanim: does a kinyan derabanan suffice to create ownership mideOraisa? This issue emerges from a series of apparently contradictory sources that must be reconciled. The primary sugya is in Bava Kamma 56a, addressing a case where someone steals an object and uses it for kiddushin. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses whether the thief has the power to determine when the object achieves a shinui (change of status), and whether kiddushin performed with stolen property creates a valid marriage requiring a get. The Rosh's language is particularly puzzling—in one place stating the woman needs a get (implying it's only a chumra, not a real marriage), while in a different case (Kiddushin) the Rosh rules that kiddushin with gezel achar yiush creates full kiddushin.
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Bava Kamma 56a
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