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What is the fundamental nature of nedarim—creating an isur in the object itself, or binding oneself to keep one's word? The shiur contrasts two competing frameworks: the Ran's position that neder creates objective kedusha in the chefetz (requiring hatfasa), versus the Rambam (רמב"ם) and Rashi (רש"י)'s approach that neder is fundamentally about keeping one's word (akin to shevu'ot but attached to an object). The implications extend to every aspect of hilchos nedarim.
This shiur presents a fundamental machloket regarding the essential nature of nedarim, contrasting the Ran with the Rambam (רמב"ם) and Rashi (רש"י). The core question is: What happens when a person declares "davar zeh asur alai"—is he creating an objective isur in the chefetz itself, or is he binding himself to keep his word not to eat it? The Ran's position, developed through his commentary in Nedarim and Shevuos, is that the yesod of neder is the creation of kedusha or isur in the chefetz. When one says "davar zeh asur alai," he means to put an isur into the object itself—to create a chefetz of isur. This is parallel to nidrei hekdesh, where one makes something kodesh. The classical case of neder according to the Ran is making one's own object into a chefetz of isur, similar to saying "harei zu olah" regarding a behema. The Ran requires that the person understand he is creating a chefetz of isur; if he merely means "I won't eat it" without intending to create objective isur, that would only be a yad, not ikar haneder.
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Nedarim 2a-2b, 14a
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