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Does mitzvah (מצוה) ba'aveirah apply to a stolen lulav used outside the Beis Hamikdash? Tosafos (תוספות) and Rabbeinu Chananel raise fundamental questions about whether the principle of mitzvah ba'aveirah is limited to korbanos or extends to all mitzvos. The shiur develops a distinction between the din of "lachem" on Yom Tov Rishon and "mikem" throughout the seven days.
This shiur explores a fundamental question in the sugya of lulav hagazul on Sukkah 30a, focusing on Tosafos (תוספות) and Rabbeinu Chananel's approach to understanding the principle of mitzvah (מצוה) ba'aveirah (a mitzvah performed through a transgression). Rabbi Zweig begins with Rav Matityahu Yitzchok Afriad's question: if someone steals money and buys an esrog, does the "but for" test apply—would this be mitzvah ba'aveirah since without the theft, the mitzvah couldn't have been performed? The shiur analyzes Rabbeinu Chananel's position, which distinguishes between different aspects of the stolen lulav prohibition. On Yom Tov Rishon, a stolen lulav is invalid because it lacks "lachem" (it must be yours). On Yom Tov Sheini, even after yiush (despair of recovery by the owner), it remains invalid due to "mikem" (it must come from you). Rabbeinu Chananel appears to hold that after yiush, there's an additional problem of mitzvah ba'aveirah, but this may be limited to the Beis Hamikdash context.
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Sukkah 30a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
