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Can a woman be mekudeshes with property attached to the ground? The Baalei Tosafot holds mechubar is invalid even for kesef kiddushin, while the Tosefta seems to permit it. The shiur distinguishes between the Bavli's drasha of venasan (requiring actual transfer) and the Yerushalmi's drasha of sefer (limiting only shtaros), showing how different understandings of the hekesh havaya le'yetziah determine whether the issur mechubar applies to kesef kiddushin or only to shtar.
The shiur opens with a fundamental question on the Baalei Tosafot, raised by the Ran and the Gaon: The Baalei Tosafot rules that one cannot be mekadesh a woman with karka (land) because mechubar (attached property) is invalid even for kesef kiddushin. Yet the Tosefta states that one cannot be mekadesh with property attached to the ground only when it is from an ir hanidachas (condemned city) that will be burned. This implies that ordinarily, mechubar would be valid for kiddushin. How can the Baalei Tosafot's position be reconciled with the Tosefta? Rabbi Zweig explains that the Baalei Tosafot's position is based on the principle of hekesh havaya le'yetziah—that the requirements of divorce (gerushin) apply to marriage (kiddushin). Since divorce requires venasan (physical transfer of the object), and giving karka does not constitute a proper transfer (the woman takes possession rather than the husband transferring it), karka cannot effect kiddushin. The Rashba makes this explicit: the reason mechubar is valid for shtar kiddushin is that the issur of mechubar stems from venasan, and we only make hekesh havaya le'yetziah for processes that parallel divorce, not for every detail of shtar.
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Kiddushin 9b
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