A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
When witnesses are proven false (hazamah) on theft testimony and later on slaughter testimony, does "im ein geneiva ein tevichah" create a complete retroactive nullification, or does the original psak remain valid until the moment of hazamah? The shiur analyzes the Tosafot's comparison to hakchasha tehilat hazamah and develops a fundamental understanding: hazamah on geneiva doesn't merely cancel the payment—it constitutes hakchasha on the tevichah testimony itself, since tevichah presumes theft.
The Gemara (גמרא) presents a complex case involving eid zomem (collusive witnesses) who testify on different days about theft (geneiva) and subsequent slaughter (tevichah) of an animal. The fundamental question is whether we apply the principle of mafrei'a hu nifsol (retroactive disqualification from the original testimony) or mekabeil haba hu nifsol (disqualification only from the moment of hazamah forward). The case unfolds as follows: On Sunday, witnesses testify about theft. On Monday, they testify about slaughter. On Tuesday, they are proven false (mezim) regarding the theft testimony. On Wednesday, they are proven false regarding the slaughter testimony. The Gemara asks: if we hold mafrei'a hu nifsol, the witnesses become disqualified retroactively from Sunday, which means their Monday testimony on tevichah should never have been valid—yet how can we now obligate them to pay for the tevichah on Wednesday if there never was a valid psak din on Monday?
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Bava Kamma 63a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
