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Why does zechiyah (acquiring on someone's behalf) work for a katan who cannot appoint a shliach? Tosafos (תוספות) on Kesubos 11a offers two approaches: either shlichus requires formal appointment while zechiyah works through assumed consent, or zechiyah represents the primary form of shlichus needing only beneficial intent. The analysis clarifies when empowerment through shlichus is required versus when zechiyah alone suffices.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of a fundamental question in Jewish law: the relationship between zechiyah (acquiring on someone's behalf) and shlichus (agency). The discussion centers on Tosafos (תוספות)' commentary on Kesubos 11a, where two different approaches are presented to explain why zechiyah works despite the fact that a katan (minor) cannot appoint a shliach (agent). The first approach of Tosafos holds that shlichus requires an actual appointment - one must explicitly tell someone "please do this for me" or command them to act. Simply expressing a desire that someone do something is not considered shlichus, as it's merely giluy da'as (revelation of intent) rather than actual appointment. Therefore, zechiyah must work through the principle of "anan sahadi de-avda de-shliach" - we assume that had the person known, he would have appointed the agent. This allows zechiyah to function even for a katan who cannot make formal appointments.
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Kesubos 11a
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