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When a man marries with a promise of a hundred but gives only one, is the woman married? The Gemara (גמרא) learns she's mekudeshes v'yashlim—married but entitled to the rest. The shiur analyzes the fundamental machloket: Does the tanai protect the maaseh kiddushin itself (Rambam (רמב"ם)), or does it protect her right to actual money rather than a debt (Raavad)? Rashi (רש"י)'s approach—that kiddushin has no purchase price at all—yields a third position.
This shiur presents a comprehensive analysis of Kiddushin 7b and the concept of mekudeshes v'yashlim—a woman who becomes married when given less than the agreed-upon value, but with conditions. The central question is: when a man says "harei at mekudeshes li b'mona" (be betrothed to me with a hundred) but gives only a dinar (one), or ninety-nine instead of a hundred, what is her status? Rabbi Zweig explains that Rashi (רש"י) learns the Gemara (גמרא) to mean the woman is not yet married, but the man can fulfill his obligation later by providing the full amount. According to Rashi, kiddushin does not create a monetary obligation (ein chiyuv damim); rather, it's based on a promise, and she relies on his good faith to fulfill it. The anticipation (tovah) she has is not a legal claim but trust in his future performance.
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Kiddushin 7b
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