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When a husband declares a get "batel," is he nullifying the document itself or merely canceling the agent's authority? The Gemara (גמרא)'s debate between Rav Nachman and Rav Sheshet hinges on whether lishmah is embedded in the writing or whether bitul targets the agency. The shiur analyzes Tosafos (תוספות)'s principle that lo asu divrei mevatel ma'aseh and traces implications for whether a rescinded get can later be revalidated.
This shiur examines a fundamental dispute in Gittin 32b between Rav Nachman and Rav Sheshet regarding the nature of bitul (nullification) of a get. The core question is whether a husband's declaration of "batel" (nullified) constitutes an act of revoking the get itself or merely an act of canceling the agent's (shliach's) authority to deliver the get. The Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion has profound implications for the mechanics of divorce and the halachic status of a document written lishmah (for the specific woman). Rav Nachman holds that one cannot be mevatel (nullify) a get that has already been written, because the writing creates a ma'aseh (concrete act) that cannot be undone by mere words. According to this view, when a husband says "batel," he is only revoking the shlichut—the agent's appointment. The get itself remains intact. Rav Sheshet, by contrast, maintains that bitul does nullify the get itself, rendering it a "chas v'shalom" (a mere piece of parchment with no halachic validity). The shiur explores whether this means the get is permanently destroyed or whether it can be reinstated.
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Gittin 32b
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