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When a father has only enough money for either pidyon haben or aliyah l'regel, which takes precedence? The shiur explores the Gemara (גמרא)'s language "podeh bno v'achar kach oleh l'regel" and reveals that the Chachamim's position includes a divine haftacha (guarantee) that funds will materialize, explaining why this case doesn't contradict the general principle that mitzvah (מצוה) overes takes precedence.
This shiur examines Kiddushin 29b, analyzing the complex dispute between the Chachamim and Rabbi Yehuda regarding a father who has limited funds and must choose between pidyon haben for his son and aliyah l'regel (the pilgrimage to Jerusalem). The fundamental question is whether this represents a conflict between mitzvah (מצוה) veres (a time-sensitive mitzvah) and mitzvah she'einah veres (a mitzvah not time-bound). Rabbi Zweig begins by analyzing the Gemara (גמרא)'s language, noting that the expression "podeh es bno v'achar kach oleh l'regel" seems to indicate the person has sufficient funds for both mitzvos, with the question being merely one of precedence (kadimah). However, the Tosafos (תוספות) Ri Azukim and the Rambam (רמב"ם) appear to understand the case as one where the father has only five selaim—enough for one mitzvah but not both. This creates a difficulty: why does the Gemara use the language "v'achar kach" (and afterward) if the person cannot afford to do both?
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Kiddushin 29b
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