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When a father has only enough money for either pidyon haben or aliyah l'regel, which takes precedence? The shiur explores the Gemara (גמרא)'s language "podeh bno v'achar kach oleh l'regel" and reveals that the Chachamim's position includes a divine haftacha (guarantee) that funds will materialize, explaining why this case doesn't contradict the general principle that mitzvah (מצוה) overes takes precedence.
This shiur examines Kiddushin 29b, analyzing the complex dispute between the Chachamim and Rabbi Yehuda regarding a father who has limited funds and must choose between pidyon haben for his son and aliyah l'regel (the pilgrimage to Jerusalem). The fundamental question is whether this represents a conflict between mitzvah (מצוה) veres (a time-sensitive mitzvah) and mitzvah she'einah veres (a mitzvah not time-bound). Rabbi Zweig begins by analyzing the Gemara (גמרא)'s language, noting that the expression "podeh es bno v'achar kach oleh l'regel" seems to indicate the person has sufficient funds for both mitzvos, with the question being merely one of precedence (kadimah). However, the Tosafos (תוספות) Ri Azukim and the Rambam (רמב"ם) appear to understand the case as one where the father has only five selaim—enough for one mitzvah but not both. This creates a difficulty: why does the Gemara use the language "v'achar kach" (and afterward) if the person cannot afford to do both?
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Kiddushin 29b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
