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Can a husband cancel a get simply by not wanting the divorce, or must he actively destroy it? The shiur builds a fundamental chakira: does bitul get (cancellation of a divorce document) require speech and action (dibbur), or is revealed intent (giluy da'as) sufficient? Two approaches among the Rishonim—one following Rashi (רש"י)/Tosafot, the other the Rashba/Rambam (רמב"ם)—yield radically different understandings of gittin, shlichut, and tok k'dei dibbur.
This shiur presents a fundamental analysis of the Gemara (גמרא) in Gittin 32a, exploring the nature of bitul get—the cancellation of a divorce document. Rabbi Zweig frames a central chakira (conceptual distinction) that runs through the Rishonim: does bitul get require actual speech and action (dibbur), or is it sufficient for there to be a revealed intent (giluy da'as) that the husband does not want the divorce to take effect? The first approach, represented by Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafot, holds that giluy da'as is sufficient. According to this view, if it is clear from the husband's actions—for instance, if he is chasing after the agent to stop him from delivering the get—that he does not want to be divorced, the get is cancelled even without explicit words. The underlying principle is that the giving of a get requires the consent and will of the husband to divorce his wife. If that will is absent or withdrawn, the get cannot take effect. This reading implies that bitul get is fundamentally about the husband's mental state and intent; as long as his intent not to divorce is manifest, the get is void.
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Gittin 32a
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