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Why does admitting to a fine-bearing offense exempt you from payment? The shiur analyzes the machlokes Rav and Shmuel on whether beis din accepts or ignores such testimony. Rashi (רש"י)'s approach suggests modeh b'knas functions like vidui—a genuine confession against one's interest—which explains why coerced admission (bisusei eidim) or admission without monetary consequence fails to create an exemption.
This shiur explores the fundamental principle of modeh b'knas—one who confesses to committing an offense that carries a monetary penalty (knas) is exempt from payment. The Gemara (גמרא) on Bava Kamma 65a discusses the dispute between Rav and Shmuel regarding what happens when someone confesses and then witnesses (eidim) subsequently appear. Rabbi Zweig opens by framing the conceptual question: when someone walks into beis din and admits to a knas, what should beis din do? According to Shmuel, modeh b'knas patur means beis din simply ignores the testimony—it's as if the person never spoke. There's no evidentiary weight to self-incrimination regarding penalties. According to Rav, however, beis din must accept the hodaah (admission) and formally rule that the person is patur (exempt). This matters because if witnesses later come (modeh b'knas v'achar kach ba'u eidim), according to Rav the original admission creates an exemption, whereas according to Shmuel it does not.
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Bava Kamma 65a
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