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Why can't kiddushin work with a loan (milva) when the lender forgives the debt? The shiur develops a fundamental understanding of kinyan kesef: it requires giving something that creates an obligation to return. Forgiving a debt (marvia chari) provides tremendous benefit, but removes a problem rather than giving something—therefore it cannot serve as kesef for kiddushin unless one explicitly hires the debtor to secure the forgiveness.
This shiur on Kiddushin 6b examines a series of challenging contradictions in Rashi (רש"י) concerning kiddushin with a loan (milva). The Gemara (גמרא) presents two statements: Rav says that if one is mekadesh with a milva, she is not mekudeshes; Abaye similarly rules that mekadesh bemilva ein mikudeshes. The apparent redundancy raises the question of what chiddush Abaye is adding beyond Rav's statement. Rabbi Zweig analyzes several textual difficulties in Rashi. On this daf, Rashi explains that when being mekadesh with a milva, the money already belongs to the woman (milva lo hitzon nitna—a loan is given to be spent). But on daf 47a, Rashi says it is only "like hers" (kidalah). Additionally, Rashi in Bava Metzia states that even when holding milva lo hitzon nitna, if the actual money is still around and the borrower returns it, certain halachic consequences follow—suggesting the money retains some connection to the lender despite being considered "given" to the borrower.
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Kiddushin 6b
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