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Why does a shliach lehalchah bringing a get from Chutz La'aretz have to say "lefanai nechtav v'nechtam" while a shliach lekabbalah does not? The shiur analyzes the Ran and Rashi (רש"י)'s approaches and develops a distinction between testifying about the paper (the get document) versus testifying about the divorce (the marriage status). A shliach lekabbalah's testimony after the divorce has occurred may have no ne'emanus, requiring two eidim instead.
The shiur begins by examining the core question of Gittin 5a: why does a shliach lehalchah (agent to deliver a get) have to declare "lefanai nechtav v'nechtam" (before me it was written and signed) when bringing a get from Chutz La'aretz, while a shliach lekabbalah (agent to receive the get) does not need to make this declaration? The Ran's explanation is presented first. The Ran argues that when a husband gives a get to a shliach lehalchah, the divorce is not yet complete at that moment—the woman remains married until she receives the get. Therefore, the husband has not yet made his final decision (gomer nefesh) and might come back and contest the get (be me'arer). However, when the husband gives the get to a shliach lekabbalah, the divorce is complete immediately at that moment in Chutz La'aretz. Since the husband has already made his final decision, there is no real concern (only a chash d'rabbanan, a rabbinic concern) that he will contest it later. According to the Ran, once the divorce has already occurred, the concern for me'arur is minimal.
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Gittin 5a
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