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When a fire I ignited before Shabbos (שבת) burns on Shabbos, am I violating Shabbos? The Nemukei Yosef asks this challenge based on the principle of esh mishum chitzav (fire is like an arrow). The shiur explores multiple approaches to this problem, including whether chilul Shabbos is defined by the forbidden result occurring or by the person's failure to rest, and examines the fundamental nature of melacha and liability.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental question from the Nemukei Yosef concerning the nature of chilul Shabbos (שבת) in relation to causation and intent. The central problem is: if one lights a fire before Shabbos that continues burning on Shabbos, should this constitute a violation of Shabbos based on the principle of esh mishum chitzav (fire is considered like an arrow)? Rabbi Zweig begins by presenting the Nemukei Yosef's question and then offers an alternative approach to answering it before examining the Nemukei Yosef's own solution. The fundamental issue at stake is how we define the melacha of Shabbos. Is the prohibition of Shabbos defined by the result—that a forbidden action occurred on Shabbos—or is it defined by the person's action—that the person failed to rest on Shabbos?
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Bava Kamma 23a
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