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What makes a phrase a valid language of kiddushin? The Gemara (גמרא) debates whether "charufasi" works outside Yehuda, revealing a fundamental tension: Is kiddushin created by formal terminology or by understood intent? The shiur develops the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position that "asukim b'oso inyan" transforms ambiguous phrases into halachic kiddushin language—creating consequences for shtaros, belief claims, and the very definition of lashon kiddushin.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 6a, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of alternative terminologies for kiddushin, specifically the case of "haomer charufasi b'Yehuda" (one who says "charufasi" in Judea). The central question is whether phrases that are not the standard "harei at mekudeshes li" can effect kiddushin, and under what circumstances. Rabbi Zweig opens with a fundamental difficulty in the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s formulation of the halachos in perek daled of Hilchos Ishus. The Rambam rules (halacha (הלכה) vav) that "harei at ishti" (behold, you are my wife) creates kiddushin, but "harei at charufasi" (using terminology from Yehuda) is only a safek kiddushin. The Gemara's principle of "asukim b'oso inyan" (engaged in discussing that matter) should resolve the doubt—if both parties are clearly discussing marriage, why is there uncertainty? The Rambam seemingly omits the Gemara's resolution that if they don't understand the terminology, they are believed to say it's not kiddushin.
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Kiddushin 6a
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