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Why is a calf born on Yom Tov permitted while a chick hatching from an egg is prohibited? The shiur analyzes the principle of "chai ma'atir atzmo beshchitah" (a living creature permits itself through slaughter) and explores whether muktzeh status depends on the mother's edibility or the offspring's independent halachic identity. Multiple Rishonim are examined on when muktzeh can be removed through this principle.
The shiur focuses on Beitzah 6b, examining a fundamental question in hilchos muktzeh on Yom Tov: what is the halachic status of offspring born or hatched on the festival? The Gemara (גמרא) presents a dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yochanan regarding when a newborn animal is permitted. The analysis centers on understanding the principle of "chai ma'atir atzmo beshchitah" — that a living creature has the potential to permit itself through slaughter — and how this interacts with muktzeh restrictions. Rabbi Zweig explores the positions of the Rambam (רמב"ם) and Rashi (רש"י) regarding the mother's status. The Rambam holds that if the mother is not "omedes le'achilah" (suitable for eating), the offspring remains prohibited. The Shulchan Aruch and Rama follow this view, establishing that when the mother is not omedes le'achilah, the offspring is prohibited due to muktzeh. However, this raises a fundamental question: if the newborn itself can be slaughtered and eaten, why should the mother's status matter?
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Beitzah 6b
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