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Can a woman breaking dishes while working for her husband claim exemption under shemirah ba'alah? The Ravad and Rambam (רמב"ם) disagree. The shiur resolves the Beis Yitzchok's question by distinguishing between mazik (intentional damage) and shomer (custodial responsibility), arguing that kabbalat shemirah itself constitutes an av requiring intelligence, not merely a toldah.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental sugya in Bava Kamma 3b concerning the distinction between av and toldah in the laws of damages, particularly focusing on when a person is liable for damage caused by involuntary acts. The discussion begins with the Beis Yitzchok's question on a Rambam (רמב"ם) in Hilchos Ishus regarding a woman who breaks vessels while working in her husband's household. The Rambam rules that she is exempt as a takanas chachamim—to ensure she will work without fear. The Ravad, however, explains the exemption through the principle of shemirah ba'alah: since the husband is considered to be working for her benefit, he bears responsibility. The Beis Yitzchok asks a fundamental question: this involves mazik (damaging), not just shemirah (custodianship). The general rule is that even if someone is working for you, if you damage their property, you are liable. Why then does the Ravad invoke shemirah ba'alah?
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Bava Kamma 3b
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