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When is a person's destructive action considered "finished"—when he lights the fire, or as the flames spread? The Nemukei Yosef argues that all damage must be "munach" (embedded) in the original act; otherwise, one could not be liable for damage after death. This principle has major implications for the machlokes esh mishum chitzah versus gufo/kocho, and explains why gravity-based damage may not be included.
This shiur analyzes the Nemukei Yosef's complex position on Bava Kamma 23a regarding when a person's action of causing damage (maase hezek) is considered complete. The central question is whether someone who starts a fire is liable for damage that occurs after his death, and what this teaches about the nature of fire liability. Rabbi Zweig opens with the Nemukei Yosef's foundational question: How can one light candles on Erev Shabbos (שבת) when the burning continues into Shabbos? The Gemara (גמרא)'s resolution—that one is liable if he dies during the fire—proves that the entire maase is considered done immediately (miyad). The Nemukei Yosef concludes that all subsequent damage from the fire must somehow be telescoped into the original act of lighting.
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Bava Kamma 23a
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