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Why does the husband write the shtar kiddushin while the seller writes the shtar mecher? The shiur develops a fundamental chakira in the mechanics of shtar as kinyan: whether shtar functions as testimony recording what already occurred, or as an active instrument creating the transaction itself. This distinction explains why different kinyanim require different parties to execute the shtar.
The shiur opens with the Gemara (גמרא)'s question on Kiddushin 9a: how can kiddushin work through a shtar written by the husband (baal), when by mecher (sale) the seller (makneh) writes the shtar? The Gemara brings the pasuk "u'machar me'achuzaso" to show that by sale, the seller writes. But this creates a difficulty: if shtar requires the makneh to write it, how can kiddushin work when the husband writes it? Rashi (רש"י) understands the Gemara's question fundamentally: it's not merely asking why they differ, but challenging whether shtar kiddushin can work at all. If the universal principle of shtar is that the makneh writes it, then a shtar written by the konen (acquirer) isn't a valid shtar. This assumes there must be a svara (logical reason) why shtar requires the makneh to write it.
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Kiddushin 9a
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