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Why does the Rambam (רמב"ם) say a katan cannot annul his wife's vows because he cannot be married, when he should simply lack the mental capacity (das) like a shoteh? The shiur develops a yesod that hafara is itself a form of neder-creation, not mere cancellation. A katan who reaches 12 has das to create nedarim (Perek 11), and therefore might have das for hafara—except he cannot marry.
This shiur on Nedarim 4b examines the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s treatment of who can annul vows (hafaras nedarim). The Rambam states that a shoteh (imbecile) cannot be meifer (annul) his wife's vows because he lacks das (mental capacity), while a katan (minor) cannot be meifer because he cannot be married (ain lo isha). Rabbi Zweig raises a fundamental question: why does the Rambam give two different reasons? Both a shoteh and a katan lack das—so why doesn't the Rambam simply say that a katan, like a shoteh, cannot annul vows due to lack of das? The shiur introduces a crucial Rambam in Perek 11, Halacha (הלכה) 1, which establishes that a katan aged twelve and one day (or a girl aged eleven and one day) has das to make a neder, provided they understand in whose name they vow. This creates a framework for understanding das in the context of nedarim: a katan at that age has the capacity to create a chalos (halachic reality) through a neder.
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Nedarim 4b
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