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The shiur analyzes the dispute between Rebbe Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding yibum with a pregnant yevama. When biya or chalitza is performed with a muberet, is it considered valid (shmo biya/chalitza) or not (lo shmo)? The Gemara (גמרא) explores what "yekayem" means—maintain the status quo or perform a new action—and whether remarriage, chalitza, or get is required after the birth reveals she was already pregnant.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Yevamos 35b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of yibum performed with a pregnant yevama (muberet) and the subsequent halachic implications. The central dispute is between Rebbe Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding whether biya with a muberet is considered valid biya (shmo biya) or not (lo shmo biya), and similarly for chalitza. The Gemara brings a challenge to Reish Lakish from a Mishna stating "ein havla cho kayom yekayem" (if she is not pregnant, he should maintain/establish the marriage). Rabbi Zweig examines Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation that the case must be one who was kones (performed yibum with) his yevama and it was later discovered she was pregnant (venimtsa muberet), not a case where he gave chalitza to a muberet woman. Rashi's distinction is critical because if the case were chalitza to a muberet, the word "yekayem" could mean he may perform yibum afterward (a support for, not a challenge to, Reish Lakish).
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Yevamos 35b
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