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When a conditional get fails because the husband dies before fulfilling the condition, is it invalid due to coercion (oinus) or because there's no posthumous divorce? The shiur analyzes whether the Gemara (גמרא)'s answer teaches one principle or establishes two separate halachic concepts, with practical implications for yibum cases.
This Gemara (גמרא) shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Kesubos 2b dealing with conditional divorce and the reasons for its invalidation. The discussion centers on a case where a husband gives his wife a conditional get stating 'this is your get if I don't return within twelve months,' but dies within six months. The Mishna rules that this is not a valid get. The Gemara initially attempts to prove from this case that there is no concept of coercion (ein oinus bigitin) in divorce law - meaning that circumstances beyond one's control don't invalidate a get. However, the Gemara challenges this proof, suggesting that perhaps there is coercion in divorce (yesh oinus bigitin), and in this case, the husband's failure to return was due to the coercion of death, making it an invalid get for that reason.
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Kesubos 2b
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