A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
When a conditional get fails because the husband dies before fulfilling the condition, is it invalid due to coercion (oinus) or because there's no posthumous divorce? The shiur analyzes whether the Gemara (גמרא)'s answer teaches one principle or establishes two separate halachic concepts, with practical implications for yibum cases.
This Gemara (גמרא) shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Kesubos 2b dealing with conditional divorce and the reasons for its invalidation. The discussion centers on a case where a husband gives his wife a conditional get stating 'this is your get if I don't return within twelve months,' but dies within six months. The Mishna rules that this is not a valid get. The Gemara initially attempts to prove from this case that there is no concept of coercion (ein oinus bigitin) in divorce law - meaning that circumstances beyond one's control don't invalidate a get. However, the Gemara challenges this proof, suggesting that perhaps there is coercion in divorce (yesh oinus bigitin), and in this case, the husband's failure to return was due to the coercion of death, making it an invalid get for that reason.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kesubos 2b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
