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When does saying "I will be a nazir when I want" create a baal tachar violation? The Gemara (גמרא)'s havamina suggests it should, since it's a definite commitment with only the timing flexible. The shiur works through why lekisheretz removes the two-year deadline and explores whether this creates a neder obligation or nazirus itself, analyzing the positions of the Rosh, Tosafos (תוספות), and a difficult Rambam (רמב"ם).
This shiur analyzes Nedarim 3b, focusing on the sugya of baal tachar (delaying fulfillment of a vow) in the context of nezirus. Rabbi Zweig opens by examining the Gemara (גמרא)'s language: when someone says "haReini nazir," the Gemara explains he cannot be over baal tachar because if he eats, he violates the nazir prohibition. The question is raised: why does the Gemara formulate it this way—"if he eats he's over"—rather than simply stating he is mechuyav not to eat? This sensitivity to the Gemara's precise wording becomes critical to understanding the entire sugya. The main focus shifts to the case of "lekisheretz"—when I want to be a nazir. The Gemara's havamina is that this should constitute baal tachar. Rabbi Zweig analyzes what lekisheretz means: does it mean "if and when I want" (creating no obligation), or does it mean "I definitely will become a nazir, but I'm reserving the right to decide when"? If the former, there's no havamina for baal tachar at all. The Gemara's question only makes sense if lekisheretz represents a definite commitment to nazirus with only the timing left flexible.
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Nedarim 3b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
