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When does saying "I will be a nazir when I want" create a baal tachar violation? The Gemara (גמרא)'s havamina suggests it should, since it's a definite commitment with only the timing flexible. The shiur works through why lekisheretz removes the two-year deadline and explores whether this creates a neder obligation or nazirus itself, analyzing the positions of the Rosh, Tosafos (תוספות), and a difficult Rambam (רמב"ם).
This shiur analyzes Nedarim 3b, focusing on the sugya of baal tachar (delaying fulfillment of a vow) in the context of nezirus. Rabbi Zweig opens by examining the Gemara (גמרא)'s language: when someone says "haReini nazir," the Gemara explains he cannot be over baal tachar because if he eats, he violates the nazir prohibition. The question is raised: why does the Gemara formulate it this way—"if he eats he's over"—rather than simply stating he is mechuyav not to eat? This sensitivity to the Gemara's precise wording becomes critical to understanding the entire sugya. The main focus shifts to the case of "lekisheretz"—when I want to be a nazir. The Gemara's havamina is that this should constitute baal tachar. Rabbi Zweig analyzes what lekisheretz means: does it mean "if and when I want" (creating no obligation), or does it mean "I definitely will become a nazir, but I'm reserving the right to decide when"? If the former, there's no havamina for baal tachar at all. The Gemara's question only makes sense if lekisheretz represents a definite commitment to nazirus with only the timing left flexible.
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Nedarim 3b
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