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Why does reading the megillah on different days create a lo saasudu problem when countless valid minhagim exist in klal Yisrael? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: lo saasudu applies only when one community views another's practice as forbidden, not when different communities simply have different customs. This reframes the entire shakla v'tarya between Reish Lakish and Rebbe Yochanan on Yevamos 13b.
The shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא)'s question regarding lo saasudu agudos (creating factions) in the context of reading the megillah on different days. The Gemara in Yevamos 13b presents a fundamental difficulty: if different communities read the megillah on the 11th, 13th, 14th, and 15th, doesn't this violate the prohibition of lo saasudu agudos, which forbids creating separate factions within klal Yisrael? Rabbi Zweig begins by challenging the basic premise of the kashya. If the Torah (תורה) itself creates different categories—kohanim, leviim, and yisraelim each have distinct obligations—how can we speak of lo saasudu when the Torah establishes these divisions? The prohibition seems to apply only when people dispute the same halacha (הלכה) and create competing camps. But here, everyone agrees on the psak: benei kfarim read on one day, benei ayarim on another, and mukafei choma on a third. There is no machlokes about the din itself; there are simply different zmanim for different categories of cities.
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Yevamos 13b
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