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How can a get thrown within the husband's dalet amos invalidate the divorce when he has no intention to acquire it himself? The shiur develops a fundamental chakira: dalet amos creates two separate dinim—one establishes "place" (makom) independent of kinyan, the other creates acquisition rights. A get fails when thrown in the husband's "place" even if the wife acquires it through kinyan chatzeiros.
This Gemara (גמרא) shiur on Gittin 78a analyzes the complex sugia of dalet amos in the context of divorce law, addressing fundamental questions about the nature of dalet amos and its relationship to kinyan. The shiur begins by examining the Gemara's discussion of when a get (divorce document) is considered validly given based on the dalet amos (four-cubit zone) of the husband and wife. The central question driving the analysis is: How can the husband's dalet amos invalidate a get when he clearly has no interest in acquiring it? The husband is trying to divorce his wife—he has no shaychus (connection) to being koneh (acquiring) the get. This fundamental difficulty runs through multiple scenarios discussed in the Gemara, including cases of karov v'lo (close but not within), chatzos shel shnayim (shared space), and efshar l'tzamtzem (whether two people can occupy a place simultaneously).
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Gittin 78a
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