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When a thief steals from another thief, does the second thief violate the issur of gezeila? The Gemara (גמרא)'s statement "ki lo nigzal min habayis" suggests there's no new act of theft when property is already stolen. However, the shiur challenges this premise: if withholding wages violates lo sigzol (per the Rambam (רמב"ם)), why wouldn't withholding someone's actual stolen property be gezeila?
The shiur analyzes Bava Kamma 52b regarding the halachic status of goniv min haganav—when one thief steals from another thief. The central issue is whether this constitutes a violation of gezeila and what the second thief's obligations are to the original owner (bailum) versus the first thief (ganav rishon). The Gemara (גמרא) introduces the principle "ki lo nigzal min habayis"—the property has already been removed from the owner's possession, so the second theft isn't considered a new act of gezeila relative to the original owner. The shiur presents Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation that this is a svara (logical principle) rather than being derived from a pasuk, while other Rishonim (the Ketzos HaChoshen, Meiri) interpret "im lo gunav mibeis ish" as a biblical source teaching that the second thief doesn't pay the bailum because the property was no longer in the owner's domain.
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Bava Kamma 52b
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