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What makes a conditional gift—given with the stipulation it be returned—count as a real transfer of ownership? The Gemara (גמרא)'s contradictory rulings about such gifts raise a fundamental question: does a recipient who must return a gift own it meaningfully enough to effect kiddushin, pidyon haben, or terumah separation? The shiur probes whether momentary ownership lacking long-term benefit can constitute value.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 6b, focusing on the sugya of matana al manas lehachzir—a gift given on condition that it be returned. The Gemara (גמרא) presents a fundamental contradiction in Rava's position: according to one statement, such a conditional gift does not effect acquisition in multiple areas (kiddushin, pidyon haben, terumah), yet according to another ruling, it does work for the mitzvah (מצוה) of esrog on Sukkos (סוכות). Rabbi Zweig frames the central conceptual question: What is the basis for saying matana al manas lehachzir sh'ma matana (it is considered a valid gift) versus lo sh'ma matana (it is not a valid gift)? Rashi (רש"י) explains the position of lo sh'ma matana with the phrase "lav midi yahiv lei"—he hasn't really given him anything. This raises a fundamental question: if someone receives an object with full ownership rights but must return it later, why isn't that considered giving something of value? The recipient does have ownership during the period of possession.
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Kiddushin 6b
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