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What is the prohibition of hachana—preparing on Shabbos (שבת) for Yom Tov or vice versa? Rashi (רש"י) holds that the issur is the absence of proper preparation from the weekday (me'erev), derived from muktzah de'oraisa. Tosafos (תוספות) argues that hachana is an independent prohibition: benefiting from an act of preparation done on one holy day for another.
This shiur explores a fundamental dispute between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) regarding the nature of the prohibition of hachana (preparing on one holy day for another). The Gemara (גמרא) in Beitzah 2b discusses the case of an egg laid on Yom Tov that falls before Shabbos (שבת)—whether it may be eaten on Shabbos. Rashi introduces muktzah into the discussion, suggesting that muktzah is de'oraisa (biblical), and that from the laws of muktzah we derive a principle: anything eaten on Shabbos or Yom Tov must be prepared me'erev (from the weekday before). According to Rashi, the problem with the egg is not that it was "prepared" on Shabbos or Yom Tov, but that it was not prepared on the weekday (Thursday if Yom Tov is Friday, or Friday if Yom Tov is Sunday). The egg completed its formation on Yom Tov, thus becoming "ready to eat" in a new way—transitioning from chicken to egg, a fundamentally different taste and food item. This completion constitutes a form of preparation (how the item will be eaten), which should have been done me'erev. The issur is not that one did something wrong on Yom Tov, but that the required preparation was lacking from the weekday.
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Beitzah 2b
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