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Can a gift given conditionally (matana al menas lehachzir) serve as a valid kinyan for kiddushin, acquiring a field, or paying off debts like pidyon haben? The Gemara (גמרא) (Kiddushin 6b) presents Rav Ashi's position that it works in all cases because it is a valid matana, yet questions persist: Does the recipient truly "own" something he must immediately return, and how can such conditional ownership constitute real payment or transfer of value?
This shiur analyzes a fundamental sugya on Kiddushin 6b concerning matana al menas lehachzir—a gift given with the explicit condition that it be returned. The central question is whether such conditional ownership can constitute a valid kinyan (act of acquisition) across different halachic contexts: marriage (kiddushin), purchasing land (mekach u'memkar), pidyon haben (redemption of the firstborn), and terumah. Rabbi Zweig begins by outlining Rav's position that when someone gives a maneh (a sum of money) al menas lehachzir, various kinyanim fail: the buyer does not acquire property (mecher lo kanah), a woman is not betrothed (isha eino mekudeshes), and pidyon haben is invalid (pidyon haben eino padui). Only in the case of terumah does it work (biterumah yotze yedei chovaso), though there is a separate issur involved (lav kamina she'nir be'kohen hamasiach bebeis hagaron).
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Kiddushin 6b
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