A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
Why does taking the lulav with the left hand invalidate the mitzvah (מצוה)? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction between netilat lulav (taking) and naanuim (waving): the right-hand requirement is only lechatechila for netila but me'akev (invalidating) for naanuim, since naanuim has a status of avodah similar to korbanot. This resolves disagreements between the Rama and Mechaber and explains the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s repetition of halachot.
This shiur presents a comprehensive analysis of the halachic requirement to take the lulav with the right hand, particularly addressing the positions of the Mechaber and Rama in Shulchan Aruch regarding a left-handed person (iter yad). The Machaber rules that a left-handed person takes the lulav the same way as everyone else (in the right hand), while the Rama holds that a left-handed person takes it in his own left hand (which for him has the status of a right hand). The Rama adds that if a left-handed person took it in his right hand, he is still yotzei b'dieved. The Taz raises three fundamental questions on this position: First, from the Gemara (גמרא) it appears that the right-hand requirement is only lechatechila (optimal) based on the reasoning that there are three mitzvos here versus one mitzvah (מצוה) with tefillin, so there is no logic to make it me'akev b'dieved. Second, the Gemara asks why one who carries lulav to reshut harabim isn't exempt based on toved var mitzvah—why doesn't the Gemara answer that he took it in his left hand rather than answering that he took it upside down? Third, why don't the poskim suggest taking it with the left hand first as an eitzah for bracha over la'asiyasa, rather than the more difficult solution of taking it upside down?
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Sukkah 30b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
