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Why does the Torah (תורה) allow killing a bab macharis (burglar) before he commits murder? The Rambam (רמב"ם) reveals two distinct principles: the burglar forfeits his blood protection (ein lo damim) once he breaks in, plus there's a duty to kill him to save his future victim. This explains why bab macharis needs separate treatment from rodef laws.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of the Mishna in Sanhedrin 72a regarding bab macharis (one who breaks in through tunneling). Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the Mishna's statement that a bab macharis is judged 'al shem sofo' (based on his end) - meaning he can be killed not for what he has done, but for what he will do. The lecturer explores several fundamental questions: At what point does someone become a bab macharis? Why does the Mishna emphasize 'nidon al shem sofo'? And where does the principle of kim lei b'rabbah (exempt from monetary payment when liable for capital punishment) originate in this context? A central focus is the relationship between bab macharis and rodef (pursuer). The Gemara (גמרא) elsewhere establishes that one may kill a rodef based on the Torah (תורה)'s teaching about saving a betrothed maiden. Rabbi Zweig questions why we need separate laws for bab macharis if he's simply another type of rodef. He suggests that bab macharis differs because his original intention is theft, not murder - he only becomes dangerous if confronted by the homeowner trying to protect his property.
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Sanhedrin 72a
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