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Why does the Torah (תורה) allow killing a bab macharis (burglar) before he commits murder? The Rambam (רמב"ם) reveals two distinct principles: the burglar forfeits his blood protection (ein lo damim) once he breaks in, plus there's a duty to kill him to save his future victim. This explains why bab macharis needs separate treatment from rodef laws.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of the Mishna in Sanhedrin 72a regarding bab macharis (one who breaks in through tunneling). Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the Mishna's statement that a bab macharis is judged 'al shem sofo' (based on his end) - meaning he can be killed not for what he has done, but for what he will do. The lecturer explores several fundamental questions: At what point does someone become a bab macharis? Why does the Mishna emphasize 'nidon al shem sofo'? And where does the principle of kim lei b'rabbah (exempt from monetary payment when liable for capital punishment) originate in this context? A central focus is the relationship between bab macharis and rodef (pursuer). The Gemara (גמרא) elsewhere establishes that one may kill a rodef based on the Torah (תורה)'s teaching about saving a betrothed maiden. Rabbi Zweig questions why we need separate laws for bab macharis if he's simply another type of rodef. He suggests that bab macharis differs because his original intention is theft, not murder - he only becomes dangerous if confronted by the homeowner trying to protect his property.
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Sanhedrin 72a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
