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Why does tzaras ervah not fall to yibum? The shiur develops a fundamental chakira: does the ervah actively patter the tzara by conferring a status of ervah (the limud of litzarah), or does the tzara simply not fall because when one wife doesn't fall to yibum, the entire bayis lacks zika? This distinction resolves the question of whether eshes ach should patter tzara and explains the shitos of Rashi (רש"י), Tosafos (תוספות), and the Rambam (רמב"ם).
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of the sugya of tzaras ervah on Yevamos 2a, focusing on the fundamental question of why the tzara of an ervah does not fall to yibum. The Gemara (גמרא) establishes that when a man dies leaving two wives, one of whom is forbidden to the yavam as an ervah, the tzara (co-wife) also does not fall to yibum. The question addressed is what mechanism accounts for this din. Rabbi Zweig develops a central chakira with two distinct approaches. The first approach, derived from the drasha of "litzarah," understands that the ervah actively patters the tzara by conferring upon her some status or quality of ervah. According to this mehalach, only certain types of arayos—specifically those involving she'er (blood relationship)—can patter a tzara. The logic is that yibum itself removes the issur of eshes ach, so eshes ach cannot be the type of ervah that patters a tzara. This is the position of Tosafos (תוספות) and perhaps the straightforward reading of the Yerushalmi cited by Rabbeinu Akiva Eiger.
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Yevamos 2a
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