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How can a pregnant woman convert her unborn child when the principle is "ein shlichas lekatan" - there's no agency for minors? Tosafot offers two approaches: either conversion is only rabbinical for such cases, or the mother has total control (bailout) over the fetus, making agency unnecessary.
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Kesubos 11a regarding the conversion of minors, specifically focusing on the case of a pregnant convert (muberish nisgaira). The central question revolves around the principle of "ein shlichas lekatan" - that one cannot serve as an agent for a minor - and how this applies to conversion, which involves both benefits (zchus) and obligations (chov). Tosafot presents two approaches to resolve this difficulty. The first teretz holds that the conversion of a minor is only mid'rabbanan (rabbinical) because when there are both benefits and obligations involved, proper agency is required, which a minor cannot provide. Since the minor cannot appoint an agent, the conversion only works rabbinically. The second teretz maintains that conversion is a complete benefit (zchus gamur), making it valid mid'oraisa (biblical).
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Kesubos 11a
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