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Must a person actively claim coercion (tainus oines) for it to invalidate a conditional get? Rashi (רש"י) holds that mere factual coercion isn't enough - one must assert the claim of oines. This explains why death differs from illness in conditional divorce cases.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental question in the laws of gittin (divorce): whether oines (coercion/circumstances beyond one's control) automatically invalidates a conditional get, or whether the coerced party must actively assert a claim of oines (tainus oines). The discussion centers on Kesubos 2b and its connection to the previous sugya about mezaynes. The main kashya (difficulty) emerges from the Gemara (גמרא)'s statement 'aval l'inyan gittin ein oines' - seemingly a simple application of the general principle that there is no oines in gittin. But Rav appears to be building on the previous discussion, suggesting a deeper connection than merely stating a well-known halacha (הלכה).
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Kesubos 2b
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