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Can a woman be married against her will? The shiur distinguishes between two types of force: physically manipulating her hand (she'lo mi'da'atah) versus threatening her until she agrees (afkinan rabbanan mi'kiddushin minei). The Gemara (גמרא) on Kiddushin 2b establishes that kiddushin requires da'as—the woman must volitionally perform the act—a chiddush because marriage benefits her.
This shiur provides a fundamental analysis of Kiddushin 2b, examining the Gemara (גמרא)'s requirement that a woman cannot be married against her will. The discussion centers on understanding the distinction between two types of forced marriage and how the Gemara, Rishonim, and Rambam (רמב"ם) address this issue. The shiur begins by analyzing the Rambam's formulation in Hilchos Ishus, which appears to present two separate halachos. The first states "ein ishah miskadeshes ela l'retzoneha" (a woman can only be married with her consent), and the second addresses "mekadesh ishah ba'al korchah" (marrying a woman by force). The Ravad Maggid suggests these represent two distinct legal principles: one regarding the requirement of da'as (volition), and another regarding the rabbinic principle of afkinan rabbanan mi'kiddushin minei (the rabbis uprooted marriages done under duress).
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Kiddushin 2b
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