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Why is one liable for damage caused by water even at a distance, yet exempt for murder? The shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא)'s distinction between koach rishon (primary force) and koach sheini (secondary force), showing that water damage liability follows one's achrayus (responsibility) for consequences, while murder requires direct physical force. The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s principle that water itself is a moving entity reshapes how we understand causation.
This shiur provides a deep analysis of Bava Kamma 4b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of liability for damage caused by water (mav/mayim). The central question is why the Gemara holds one liable for water damage (nezikin) even when the damage occurs through koach sheini (secondary force), while in capital cases (retzicha) liability requires koach rishon (primary force). The shiur opens with Tosafos (תוספות)'s question: the Gemara initially suggests that releasing water creates liability only as grama (indirect causation), yet concludes one is liable even in koach sheini. Since grama ordinarily exempts from liability, what changed between the question and answer? The Chazon Ish addresses a parallel question: how can Tosafos later rule that moving a burning coal (dlil) from an enclosed to a public space creates liability if another person then uses it to cause damage—isn't this the ultimate grama?
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Bava Kamma 4b
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