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Was Moshe's hiding his face at the burning bush a merit or a mistake? The machloket in Berachos reflects whether Moshe could have achieved divine vision through total bittul. Using the Kli Yakar's distinction between Moshe and Yehoshua removing shoes, the shiur develops that "lo yirani ha'adam vachai" means one cannot see God while remaining an "adam" - but transcending to "admas kodesh" makes divine vision possible.
This shiur examines a fundamental machloket in Gemara (גמרא) Berachos chapter seven regarding Moshe Rabbeinu's reaction at the burning bush when he hid his face from Hashem (ה׳). One opinion holds this was a zechus (merit) that later earned him the radiance of his face (karno panav). The opposing view considers it a tainah (complaint) - that when Hashem wanted to show Moshe divine revelation, Moshe refused to look, and therefore when Moshe later requested "Ha'reini na es kevodecha" at Har Sinai, Hashem responded "when I wanted, you didn't want; now that you want, I don't want." Rabbi Yeshaya Greenberg ZT"L addresses the Maharsha's difficulty: according to the second opinion, if Moshe could have seen the divine, how do we understand "ki lo yirani ha'adam vachai" (a person cannot see Me and live)? The analysis incorporates insights from Kli Yakar and Rabbeinu Bechaye regarding the command "shal na'alecha me'al raglecha" (remove your shoes). They contrast Moshe's experience with Yehoshua's encounter with an angel - both were told to remove footwear, but the language differs significantly. Yehoshua was told "shal na lecha" (singular shoe) because he could only purify his spiritual side while his physical remained a barrier. Moshe was told "shal na'alecha" (plural shoes) indicating his capacity to purify even his physical being completely. Furthermore, Moshe was told the place was "admas kodesh" (holy ground) while Yehoshua heard only "kodesh" (holy place), suggesting Moshe could sanctify even the physical adamah itself. Rabbi Yeshaya Greenberg ZT"L proposes that according to the second opinion in the Gemara, Moshe indeed could have seen the Divine, but it required total bittul (self-nullification) and zichuch chomer (refinement of physicality). The phrase "ki lo yirani ha'adam vachai" specifically uses "adam" (from adamah - earth) to indicate that one who remains on the level of physical existence cannot see God. However, if one achieves complete bittul and becomes "admas kodesh," transcending ordinary human limitations, divine vision becomes possible. Moshe's fear wasn't mere terror but recognition that seeing would require absolute self-nullification - becoming no longer an "adam" but rather "admas kodesh." His choice to remain afraid represented choosing to stay within normal human boundaries rather than achieving total transcendence of physicality.
Berachos 7a
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