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When does the husband's verbal declaration ("hagitach") need to happen—before, during, or after physically handing the get? The Gemara (גמרא)'s cases of finding the get behind him or giving it while she sleeps force the question: is amira part of the maaseh nesina itself, or a separate requirement for chalus haget? Rashi (רש"י), Tosafos (תוספות), the Baal HaMaor, and the Rambam (רמב"ם) each offer distinct readings of whether the original nesina counts or a new nesina is created by the words.
This shiur on Gittin 78a examines the role of amira—the husband's verbal declaration to the wife—in the process of giving a get. The Mishna presents two cases where the get is delivered without proper amira: (1) when the wife finds the get behind her husband (starikov matsaso meachorov), and (2) when he places it in her hand while she is asleep (nasan lah v'hi yeshena). In both cases, Rebbe holds that if the husband later says "harei hu gitach," it becomes a valid get without needing to physically retake and re-give the document. The Gemara (גמרא)'s analysis reveals fundamental questions about the structure of gittin. Is the verbal declaration part of the maaseh nesina (the act of giving), or is it a separate requirement? If it's part of nesina, how can saying "hagitach" after she already received the document create a valid divorce? The Rishonim offer radically different answers.
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Gittin 78a
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