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How does din shneihem work when neither the woman nor the recipient performs the kinyan act? The shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא)'s attempt to derive din shneihem from arev and eved Canaani, arguing that unlike those cases where one party actively performs the ma'aseh kinyan, din shneihem may operate through gemirus das (mutual consent) rather than a full-fledged kinyan obligation.
This shiur examines the difficult Gemara (גמרא) in Kiddushin 7a concerning din shneihem—where a woman says "give money to this person and I will be married to you." The Gemara attempts to derive this case from two principles: din arev (guarantor) and eved Canaani, but encounters significant difficulties. Rabbi Zweig begins by establishing that in every kinyan, there is typically an active party who performs the ma'aseh kinyan and a passive party who gives consent. In din arev, where the woman tells one person to give money to another and she will marry the giver, the fundamental question is: who performs the actual kinyan? The woman (A) doesn't receive the money directly, the middleman (B) spends the money, and perhaps someone else (C) receives it. Rabbi Zweig argues that in arev, the active party performing the kinyan must be B (the one spending), while A is passive but demonstrates gemirus das (definitive consent) by directing B to spend on her behalf.
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Kiddushin 7a
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