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What distinguishes the av of adam from its toldos? The shiur contrasts the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s view that the Mishna's adam refers to volitional acts (Perek Alef)—carrying isur, immediate chiyuv, and shivud mechaseir—with the Rif's position that the Mishna discusses only responsibility for nezek (Perek Vav). The analysis explores how kocho v'niro, yosher, and other toldos fit into these competing frameworks.
This shiur analyzes Bava Kamma 3b, focusing on the fundamental distinction between avos and toldos in the context of adam hamazik (human damages). The central question is: what is the defining characteristic of the av of adam mentioned in the Mishna, and how do the various toldos relate to it? Rabbi Zweig presents two major approaches, represented by the Rambam (רמב"ם) and the Rif. According to the Rambam, the av of adam in the Mishna refers to Perek Alef—a volitional act of damage. This means adam hamazik involves intentional action where a person decides to do something harmful. All toldos of this av must share this characteristic of being "harei zeh k'mazik b'yado" (it is as if he damaged with his hand). The Rambam's approach carries several halachic implications: there is an isur (prohibition) involved, there is shivud mechaseir (immediate liability), and the person is liable immediately upon performing the action, not just when damage occurs.
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Bava Kamma 3b
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