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Why do Chazal require testimony that a get was written lishma when we already have a rov? The shiur distinguishes between worry for miyut (which is covered by rov) versus speculation about a found get (nimtza), arguing that speculation creates a different kind of chashash—one where eidus is appropriate even though it's not a classic devar shebe'ervah.
This shiur analyzes Gittin 2b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of why Rabanan require witnesses that a get was written lishma (for the sake of the specific husband and wife). The shiur begins with Rashi (רש"י)'s explanation that the concern is not just that the get might be invalid, but that perhaps it was found (nimtza)—someone discovered a pre-written get for another couple with the same names and used it to divorce his wife. The central question raised is: Why didn't the Gemara simply say that Rabanan are concerned for the miyut (minority) of gittin not written lishma? According to Rav Meir's position (as explained in Tosfos in Chullin), being chayesh for a miyut is only a din d'Rabanan. So why does the Gemara need to introduce a new speculation about found gittin? Why not just rely on the standard concern for the minority case?
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Gittin 2b
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