No community start suggestion yet.
Why do Chazal require testimony that a get was written lishma when we already have a rov? The shiur distinguishes between worry for miyut (which is covered by rov) versus speculation about a found get (nimtza), arguing that speculation creates a different kind of chashash—one where eidus is appropriate even though it's not a classic devar shebe'ervah.
This shiur analyzes Gittin 2b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of why Rabanan require witnesses that a get was written lishma (for the sake of the specific husband and wife). The shiur begins with Rashi (רש"י)'s explanation that the concern is not just that the get might be invalid, but that perhaps it was found (nimtza)—someone discovered a pre-written get for another couple with the same names and used it to divorce his wife. The central question raised is: Why didn't the Gemara simply say that Rabanan are concerned for the miyut (minority) of gittin not written lishma? According to Rav Meir's position (as explained in Tosfos in Chullin), being chayesh for a miyut is only a din d'Rabanan. So why does the Gemara need to introduce a new speculation about found gittin? Why not just rely on the standard concern for the minority case?
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Gittin 2b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
