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Why does the Torah (תורה) require a *pruta* for kiddushin, and can something equivalent in value (*shave kesef*) substitute for actual money? The shiur analyzes Tosafos (תוספות)'s two approaches: first, that *shave kesef* qualifies because it has asset value like money; second, that it works because it can be converted to cash. The deep question is whether kiddushin is a ritual act requiring specific materials or a contractual transaction accepting equivalent value.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Tosafos (תוספות) on Kiddushin 2a, examining the principle of *shave kesef k'kesef* (goods equivalent to money) and how it applies to kiddushin. Tosafos asks why the Mishna says "shave kesef" when it could simply say "kesef" (money), similar to the language used regarding an *eved ivri* (Hebrew slave). The fundamental question is whether kiddushin, pidyon haben, and other ritual acts can be performed with items of equal value rather than actual currency. Tosafos raises the difficulty that we might need a special verse to permit *shave kesef* in each context. The Gemara (גמרא) teaches that an *eved ivri* requires a verse, and *pidyon haben* (redemption of the firstborn) also requires a verse. Tosafos suggests that pidyon haben derives this from a *klal u'prat u'klal*, but the question remains for *erchin* (valuations) and kiddushin. How do we know *shave kesef* works for these?
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Kiddushin 2a
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